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1963] RECENT DECISIONS 1189 
T AXATioN-AccouNTING METHoDs--FoRFEITURE OF PRIVILEGE OF ELECT-
ING INSTALLMENT BAS1s--During 1953, petitioner sold her farm and 
agreed to receive payment in yearly installments. Her 1953 income tax 
return, in which she elected to report the sale on the installment basis,1 
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 44(b)(2), 53 Stat. 25 [now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
I 45!1(b)(2)]. This provision states: "In the case ••• of a sale or other disposition of 
real property, if in either case the initial payments do not exceed 80 per centum of 
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was not filed until 1957. Respondent, the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, assessed a deficiency and included the entire gain from the trans-
action in petitioner's 1953 return. On the basis of previous Tax Court 
decisions, he contended that petitioner was not entitled to use the install-
ment method because of her failure to file a timely return. Petitioner 
argued that neither the statute nor the regulations required a timely 
return as a prerequisite to electing. On petition to the Tax Court, held, 
for respondent, five judges dissenting. The privilege of electing the install-
ment method for reporting gain from the disposition of property is for-
feited unless an election is made in the year of the sale. Marion C' de Baca, 
38 T.C. 609 (1962). 
In 1938 the Supreme Court held that once the taxpayer has elected a 
particular method for reporting an installment sale he is bound by his 
election and may not later amend it.2 This rule was not based on any 
express or implied directive in either the Code or the Treasury regulations.3 
Disallowance of amended elections was instead rested upon the proposi-
tion that Congress intended the use of the installment method-a scheme 
designed to reflect annual income more clearly-to be a mere elective 
right.4 Since regarding it as involving only a right to elect, the courts have 
felt free to condition its use upon a proper election in a return filed in 
a timely fashion.5 
the selling price •.. , the income may, under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner 
with the approval of the Secretary, be returned on the basis and in the manner above 
prescribed in this section." Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 44(a), 53 Stat. 24, allows 
the taxpayer to return as income from an installment sale in any taxable year that 
proportion of the installment payments actually received in that year which the gross 
profit, realized or to be realized when payment is completed, bears to the total contract 
price. 
2 Pacific Nat'l Co. v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191 (1938). Accord, Jacobs v. Commissioner, 
224 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1955); Marks v. United States, 98 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1938); Erhart 
v. Gray, 192 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Ky. 1961); Coffin v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. 
Ala. 1954); Albert Vischia, 26 T.C. 1027 (1956); Max Viault, 36 B.T.A. 430 (1937). 
3 There is no indication whether Congress intended the allowance of amended 
elections, since neither § 44 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1936 (§ 44 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1939) nor the pertinent regulation thereunder expressly requires an 
unequivocal election of the installment method. It is clear, however, that the taxpayer 
will receive considerable benefit even if the period of election is restricted to the year 
of the sale. See also Treas. Reg. § 1453-8 (1958) which, though declared to be non• 
retroactive, demands that gross profit be mentioned in the return for the year of the 
sale if the installment method is to be used. See also Rev. Rul. 93, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 
82, which requires that the return for the year of the sale be filed in a timely fashion. 
4 For discussion of the congressional intention that the installment method should 
be a limited privilege, see generally Pacific Nat'l Co. v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191, 194 (1938); 
W. A. Ireland, 32 T.C. 994, 997 (1959); Lang, Installment Sales in Their Relation to 
Business and Taxation, 5 NAT'L TAX MAGAZINE 407 (1927) (now TAXES). 
5 The following decisions, with factual situations similar to that in the Welch case, 
have refused the belated use of the installment method where an election had not been 
made in an otherwise timely return for the year of the sale. W. A. Ireland, supra note 4; 
Western Supply 8c Furnace Co., 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 253 (1959); Paul Haimovitz, 25 
P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 253 (1956); W. T. Thrift, Sr., 15 T.C. 366 (1950). In Sarah Briarly, 
29 B.T.A. 256 (1933), the Commissioner reported for the taxpayer, due to her failure 
to file any return, and her claim that a sale should have been reported on the install-
ment basis was denied. Cf. Johnson Realty Trust, 21 B.T.A. 1333 (1931). 
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Soon after the Supreme Court decision, however, courts began to 
recognize the harshness of a denial of the use of the installment basis in 
every case of belated election; consequently, a number of decisions have 
relaxed the strict election rule. Indeed, the dissent in the principal case 
emphasized these decisions in reasoning that petitioner had the right to 
use the installment basis.6 The dissenting opinion failed to notice, how-
ever, the element of good faith which distinguished those decisions from 
the principal case. Illustratively, in Scales v. Commissioner7 the petitioner 
erroneously reported the income from a sale of real property as rent. The 
court felt that, although there was no express election of the installment 
basis, he could nevertheless exercise his right belatedly. In overruling the 
Commissioner's deficiency assessment, the court reasoned that "failure to 
adopt ritualistic measures should not foreclose the allowance to all lawful 
benefits under the statute."8 The good faith reporting of the transaction in 
a timely return appears to be the determining factor in that court's deci-
sion. Clearly, consideration of such a factor avoids prejudicing the integrity 
of the strict election rule. Furthermore, permission to shift from the report-
ing of the sale as rent to reporting it as an installment sale gave the peti-
tioner no tax advantage. 
More recently, in Hornberger v. Commissioner9 the Fifth Circuit broad-
ened the exception to the general rule by allowing an untimely election 
though the transaction there was not even reported. The petitioners in 
that case had decided to report a sale on the installment basis, but, due 
to an error by their hired accountant, the sale was not disclosed in their 
return. A good faith attempt at a proper election was evidenced by the 
testimony at the trial: the taxpayers had not sought, in the first instance, 
to avoid the strict election rule.10 Thus, allowance of a belated election did 
not undermine the spirit of the rule. The Hornberger decision has received 
the approval of one authoritative writer in the tax field,11 and appears to be 
the leading case in an emerging trend of exceptions to the strict election 
rule. 
Even the Tax Court has relaxed its narrow construction of the rule, 
although it is ostensibly unwilling to accept fully the Scales decision.12 
In some cases, the Tax Court has seemed to require a greater degree of 
good faith than is evidenced in the circuit court decisions. For example, in 
John F. Bayley13 the taxpayer did not elect an accounting method when 
6 Principal case at 619-20. 
7 211 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir. 1954). Accord, United States v. Eversman, 1113 F.2d 261 (6th 
Cir. 1943), where taxpayer mistakenly reported the sale as non-taxable income and was 
allowed to amend his return in order to elect the installment method. 
s Scales v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 133, 134 (6th Cir. 1954). 
ll 289 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1961). 
10 Id. at 604. 
11 2 MERTENS, I.Aw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 15.06 (Supp. 1962, at 95-96). 
12 See W. A. Ireland, 32 T.C. 994, 998 (1959). See also Jacobs v. Commissioner, 224 
F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1955). The Ninth Circuit disagrees with the result in the Scales 
case. 
13 35 T.C. 288 (1960). 
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he reported the sale of real estate. The omission was due to the fact that he 
was using the proceeds to purchase a new residence and he therefore in-
tended the gain to be unrecognized. He did not reside in his new home 
within the alloted time, however, and therefore lost the benefit of the 
otherwise satisfied non-recognition provision.14 The court alleviated his 
misfortune by allowing a belated election of the installment method.15 
Permission to amend a previous election, or to elect in an untimely 
fashion in order to use the installment basis, results, in effect, in an ex-
tension of the filing period. The facts of the cases authorizing such prac-
tices are often difficult to distinguish from those in decisions denying 
belated elections. In the former group of cases, a close examination reveals 
that the courts based their decisions, in varying degrees, on the taxpayers' 
good faith in failing to disclose the sale or in erroneously reporting the 
transaction.16 Approval of a late election in a factual situation like that 
of the principal case, however, would place a premium on the taxpayer's 
negligence17 and thereby bring about a result which most certainly could 
not live harmoniously with the Supreme Court's binding election rule. 
The requirement of timely election forces the taxpayer who files a timely 
return to speculate in the year of the sale as to how much income he will 
acquire in the following years. Retrospective elections would permit tax-
payers to replace this speculation with a decision based on positive knowl-
edge as to what method of reporting would minimize his taxes. Thus, fail-
ure to file prompt returns would be encouraged and the careless taxpayer 
would have an advantage over the one who makes a timely election. This 
is especially true where installment sales are the taxpayer's principal source 
of income. 
The allowance of belated or amended elections by taxpayers proving 
that they were not flagrantly negligent and that in the first instance they 
did not seek the advantage of a retrospective election indicates a wise relax-
ation of an otherwise harsh rule. By means of a careful consideration of the 
facts of each case, courts can determine whether the taxpayer acted in good 
faith or without negligence and can thereby avoid encouraging negligent 
late-filing. If permission were given to make an untimely election in the 
principal case, however, the rule denying amended elections would be 
hopelessly vitiated: the taxpayer here was incontestably negligent. An 
14 See INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 1034(a), which provides, in certain cases, for non-
recognition of gain on the sale of a principal residence. 
15 See also Jack Farber, 36 T.C. 1142 (1961). Taxpayer did not receive any payment 
in the year of the sale and reported the transaction in his return for the following year, 
when he first received income. He was allowed to amend his initial return in order to 
elect the installment method properly. It is argnable that this case reveals a willingness 
on the part of the Tax Court to proceed at least as far as the circuit courts. 
16 But see Nunn v. Gray, 196 F. Supp. 305 (W.D. Ky. 1961). In this case, the court 
recognized a late election of the installment method although the taxpayer had neither 
reported the sale in good faith nor evidenced a lack of negligence. This case appears to 
be an undue extension of the recent liberal interpretations. 
17 Principal case at 615. 
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extension of the liberal trend to encompass this case would be to misinter-
pret the trend entirely. It would only be a short step from permitting an 
untimely election in the principal case to permitting an amended election 
where the original one had been deliberate but unwise. 
Daniel R. Elliott, Jr. 
1 This plan was adopted for forty of the company's officers and executives. In the 
decedent's case, the maximum payable to his survivors was $100,000. 
2 "The gross estate shall include the value of an annuity or other payment receivable 
by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent under any form of contract or 
agreement ••• if, under such contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment was 
payable to the decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to receive such annuity or 
payment, either alone or in conjunction with another for his life or for any period 
not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not 
end before his death." !NT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 2039(a). The related regulations sub-
sequently issued state that the decedent will be regarded as having possessed the right 
to receive an annuity or other payment if, immediately before his death, he had an 
enforceable right to receive payments at some time in the future. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-
l(b) (1958), 
